One of the main tasks of legal systems is to provide remedies for violations (or sometimes expected violations) of the primary rights they confer. Thus, if someone is injured by the negligence of others, a claim for damages usually arises. If he is killed, his family members can have an independent claim for compensation, etc. Other types of remedies may include injunctions requiring the guilty party to enforce or refrain from taking a particular course of action, very often what it was or was not required to do under primary law. These rights are often very complex in detail. For example, the amount of damages may be different if the tort is tortious, as opposed to a breach of contract. Similarly, in many systems, some remedies must be granted by law, while others are left to the discretion of the court. To illustrate the remedies available in both British legal systems, see Lawson (1980) and Walker (1974). The philosophical debate between universalists and relativists is far too complex to summarize here. However, some immediate responses to the relativistic critique of human rights are immediately available. First, mere reference to moral diversity and the presumed integrity of individual cultures and societies does not in itself provide a philosophical justification for relativism or a sufficient critique of universalism. After all, there were and still are many cultures and societies whose treatment of one`s own people leaves much to be desired.

Does relativism really ask us to recognize and respect the integrity of Nazi Germany or any other similar repressive regime? There is little doubt that relativism in its present form is incompatible with human rights. At first glance, this seems to give argumentative weight to universalist support for human rights. Finally, one can speculate on the willingness of a relativist to effectively renounce the possession of human rights if and when the social environment requires it. Similarly, relativistic arguments are usually advanced by members of political elites in countries whose systematic oppression of their peoples has attracted the attention of human rights defenders. The exponential growth of people`s human rights organizations in many countries of the world, whose cultures are supposedly incompatible with the implementation of human rights, raises serious questions about the validity and integrity of these “indigenous” relativists. At worst, the doctrine of moral relativism could be used to illegitimately justify oppressive political systems. Concerns about the alleged incompatibility of human rights and community moral systems seem to be a more legitimate issue. Human rights have unquestionably understood that the main holder of human rights is the individual person.

This is largely due to the Western origins of human rights. However, it would be equally accurate to say that the so-called “third generation” of human rights is much better suited to the community and collective basis of many individuals` lives. In line with the work of political philosophers such as Will Kymlicka, there is a growing awareness of the need to adapt human rights principles to things like the collective rights of minorities and, for example, the claims of these minorities on communal land rights. Although human rights remain philosophically rooted in an individualistic moral doctrine, there is no doubt that attempts are being made to apply human rights appropriately to more community-oriented societies. Human rights can no longer be accused of being “culturally blind”. The legal theory of the American legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin attacks legal positivists who separate the content of law from morality. [57] In his book Law`s Empire,[58] Dworkin argued that law is an “interpretive” concept that requires lawyers to find the most appropriate and equitable solution to litigation, given their constitutional traditions.